Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 16

Issue 4

Article 8

10-1-1999

Peter Forrest, GOD WITHOUT THE SUPERNATURAL: A DEFENSE
OF SCIENTIFIC THEISM
Simon J. Evnine

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Evnine, Simon J. (1999) "Peter Forrest, GOD WITHOUT THE SUPERNATURAL: A DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC
THEISM," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 16 : Iss. 4 , Article 8.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199916449
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol16/iss4/8

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

BOOK REVIEWS

573

Concerning Natural Religioll as insincere in a certain respect; indeed if he
was convinced first of the logical incoherence (and not just the falsity) of
theism, why should he not then view the way of life that springs from it
as absurd? I am not here to defend him in his conclusions, but to wonder whether Herdt is correct in her accusation, which implies that Hume
argued from the charge of absurdity. Perhaps Hume's disdain for religious factionalism in eighteenth-century England motivated his discussions; did it also motivate the conclusions of particular arguments? It is
up to Hume's readers to ask whether his arguments concerning religious
belief are sound.
NOTES
1. Pall, Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh
University Press), 1966, and Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the
Relation between with Special Reference to Hume's "Treatise"(Oxford Clarendon
Press), 1972 .
2. See, for example, Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on
Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1991; Charlotte
Brown, "From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation," HU1I1e
Studies XX (April 1994): 19-36; Rachel Cohon, "Is Hume a Noncognitivist in
the Motivation Argument?" Philosophical Studies 85 (March 1997): 251-66 ;
Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in HUl1lc's Mornl Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 1997): Chapter 9; Elizabeth Radcliffe, "Hume on
Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of
Morality," Hume Studies XX (April 1994): 37-58.
3. She also cites Annette Baier as an ally in this.
4. See Elizabeth Radcliffe, "Hume on Motivating Sentiments," and
"How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate?" Journal of the History of
Philosophy 34 (July 1996): 47-70.
5. Hume's claim that reason alone does not produce motives has mostly
been understood as the view that beliefs do not motivate, although a few critics have recently questioned this interpretation. Herdt might want to take
the view that Hume's thesis about the inertness of reason leaves it open that
the products of understanding can motivate, but I think the orthodox interpretation, which rules this out, stands on solid ground. She says herself that
the intentional, rational activities of the judge, rather than the sense of taste,
do the work in Hume's account (125); so it's difficult to see how she can
argue that reason and sympathetic understanding are two different things.

God Without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism by Peter
Forrest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). ISBN 0-8014-3255-3. Pp,
xiv, 256.
SIMON J, EVNINE, California Polytechnic State University
Near the beginning of his book, Peter Forrest tells us of "the sensitive
New Age cat who never eats meat and never hunts birds and lizards.
Does it, I ask, ever get the chance? Likewise," he goes on to add, "it is no
wonder that intellectual conversion to religion is rare-no one ever
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tries" (15). Forrest wants to let the cat out of the Bagwan and provide an
intellectual argument for anthropic theism. This is the position that
asserts the existence of a personal God and the creation of the world
largely for the sake of embodied persons. To be more precise, Forrest
intends to provide intellectual grounds for rejecting atheism. His
approach is one of best-explanation apologetics: theism provides explanations of a number of phenomena that are superior to the explanations
provided by naturalistic alternatives. This makes irrational the atheistic
rejection of theism. However, since we cannot rule out that some further
explanation may come along that outdoes theistic explanation, Forrest
does not take issue with the agnostic, whose position he sees as warranted. (A short conclusion to the book does take some steps towards showing that theism is to be preferred to agnosticism, but on emotional,
rather than intellectual, grounds.)
The book's title derives from the fact that although Forrest intends to
show the inadequacy of naturalism, he eschews supernaturalism.
Naturalism posits only entities for which well-confirmed scientific theories provide a precedent. Supernaturalism, by contrast, is prepared to
posit entities for which neither science nor the familiar facts of everyday
life provide any precedent. Forrest splits the difference: he will allow
entities for which science provides no precedent, so long as the familiar
facts of everyday life do.
Forrest is admirably clear about what, exactly, he needs to show. His
case for anthropic theism has three major components. First, he must
show that such theism does indeed provide explanations of his chosen
phenomena superior to those provided by its naturalist alternatives. (It
would have been nice also to have seen theism compared to some nonnaturalist alternatives such as Platonism. Perhaps Forrest would argue
that Platonism should be dismissed as a form of supernaturalism.) The
second thing to be shown is that anthropic theism is a genuine epistemic
possibility, by which Forrest means that it is "a hypothesis that is not too
improbable on background evidence" (26). Much of Forrest's discussion
of the nature of God takes place under this rubric. A third and final component in the defense of anthropic theism is required, though, since
however superior the explanations provided by some hypothesis, and
however genuinely epistemically possible that hypothesis is, a good
solid argument against it can still show it to be unacceptable.
Consequently, the major outstanding argument against anthropic theism, the problem of evil, must be shown to be capable of a solution.
As can be seen from a consideration of this strategy, while the book as
a whole is supposed to provide an argument that it would be unreasonable to reject theism, Forrest rarely has to argue for the truth of any particular theistic claim. Instead, he shows that various theistic hypotheses
can be framed, can explain various phenomena, are genuine epistemic
possibilities, and so on. This gives him a wide latitude. Instead, for
instance, of arguing in favor of an account of why and how God creates
the world, he can simply elaborate a number of different, sometimes
even competing accounts as evidence that a theist can offer explanations
superior to those of a naturalist. One of the more interesting parts of the
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book, in fact, is Forrest's discussion, in chapter I, of the legitimacy and
the epistemological implications of this method of speculation.
The topics raised and discussed in the course of the book are many
and varied. Combined with the method of speculation, which often
results in multiple answers to a single problem, the book induces a
breathless vertigo. Countless capitalized Principles, Conjectures, Theses,
Arguments, Razors, and Positions swim on and off a single page, never
to be heard of again. Highly controversial issues, such as the nature of
consciousness or moral reasoning, are dispensed with relatively quickly
and superficially. Anyone reading this book is bound to feel at some
point that a favorite subject is being unfairly and unthoroughly treated.
The phenomena which Forrest argues can be best explained by a theistic
hypothesis include the fitness of the universe for life, the regularity of
the laws of nature, our capacity for intellectual progress, the supremacy
of moral reasoning, beauty, and mathematics. The discussion of the fitness of the universe for life, in turn, involves considerations about creation, and hence about action in general; and about the afterlife, and
hence about personal identity and survival. The attempt to establish the
genuine epistemic possibility of theism is based on an examination of
the nature of persons, consciousness and the relation of mind and body.
The attack on the problem of evil takes in Leibnizian theories of possible
worlds and Hick's views on soul-making.
1 shall focus on one area in which I felt my own philosophical toes
being trodden on. This concerns the part of Forrest's book in which he
attempts to show that theism is a genuine epistemic possibility. To begin
with, there is some unclarity on how the theistic position claimed to be a
genuine epistemic possibility relates to traditional conceptions of God.
Near the beginning of the book, Forrest says that although he is not
"committed to the classical doctrines of the necessity, eternity, and simplicity of God ... [his] speculations indeed support something like these
classical doctrines" (9). How these classical doctrines are supported is
never explained, and as Forrest's conception of God (or rather, his speculation about God) is articulated, it often seems downright inconsistent
with these classical positions. Indeed, it turns out that Forrest supports
what he calls an objective, but non-objectual theism. That is, while he
holds it is an objective fact that there is a Cod, there is no object (of any
kind) that God is. For this reason, Forrest prefers the expression of theism as "There is a God" rather than "Cod exists." However, the issues
involved in distinguishing these two formulations (for instance, the
apparent ambiguity over whether "God" is a proper name or a general
term) are never adequately discussed, nor is the issue of how the classical doctrines should be translated into non-objectual terminology. The
classical claim that God is a necessary being, for instance, is clearly not
equivalent to the claim that necessarily there is a God.
Although it was explicitly not part of Forrest's object to defend the
classical doctrines about Cod, I spend so much time on this because his
own speculation about the nature of God is sufficiently strange (at least
relative to traditional monotheistic theology) to make it virtually obligatory to relate it to more traditional thought about Cod if his defense of
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theism is to be of interest to many readers. Furthermore, he himself
relies so much on objectual-sounding discourse that when we finally
learn that, on his theistic speculation, there is no object God, we must
seriously question everything that has hitherto been said.
Forrest's most fully worked out speculation as to the nature of God is
that God is unrestricted consciousness. This is reached in the following
way. Human consciousness is a phenomenon that a purely naturalist
account of the world must stumble over. Nonetheless, it is a familiar fact.
It therefore creates a (non-supernaturalist) theoretical niche for God, a
way of showing that if God can be construed as a kind of consciousness,
then it is a genuine epistemic possibility that there is a God. Forrest, however, avoids reifying consciousness, preferring a Neo-Humean account
on which a mind is a bundle of episodes of consciousness. Furthermore,
an episode of conscious awareness is merely the appearance of something. What ties some episodes of consciousness into a bundle is simply
the unity of that of which they are the appearances. On Forrest's account,
a human mind is a consciousness of one integrated sub-system in the universe - a particular brain. God, being unrestricted consciousness, is the
sum total of appearances of the universe. (A consequence of this, noted
by Forrest, is that our minds are distinguished from God as parts are
from the whole. Here we have another conflict between Forrest's theistic
speculations and traditional conceptions of God since on such traditional
conceptions, God is simple and without parts.)
This leads to a problem that Forrest acknowledges but does not adequately address. Awareness of something, in certain modalities, is necessarily awareness of something from a particular point of view. This is
the case with visual awareness, for example. Thus, for any given object,
there will be as many appearances of it as there are perspectives from
which it can appear. (I presume this means there are an infinite number
of appearances of each thing, though nothing that follows depends on
this.) How, then, are we to understand the existence of a being described
as unrestricted consciousness? There seem to be two possibilities. One is
that for God, awareness is never from a point of view. God can thus be
aware of all parts of a single physical thing in one episode of awareness.
This option is fatal for Forrest's strategy, for the speculation about God
as unrestricted consciousness was part of an attempt to demonstrate the
genuine epistemic possibility of God on the grounds that human consciousness provided a theoretical niche for God. The option under consideration, though, undermines the similarity between human and
divine consciousness, throwing into doubt the genuine epistemic possibility of God understood in this way.
The second option for dealing with the problem is to suppose that
God is a simultaneous awareness of everything from every point of
view, much like a giant bank of TV screens, each with the appearance of
something from a particular point of view. At the very least, this option
raises a number of questions, none of which are answered by Forrest. In
the case of embodied persons, different appearances can be taken as
appearances of a single thing because such persons themselves occupy a
place in the world of things of which they are aware. It is precisely the
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restrictions imposed by embodiment that allow consciousness to be synthesized into experience of an ordered world. This is a point urged by
Kant and recently re-advocated by Strawson. In the case of unrestricted
consciousness, however, there is no place occupied by the experiencer.
There is, therefore, no way of correlating different appearances as
appearances of a single object. Once again, therefore, we come up
against a very substantial way in which divine consciousness fails to fit
into the theoretical niche provided by human consciousness.
I am therefore left with the feeling that the speculation that God is
unrestricted consciousness has been far from shown to be a genuine
epistemic possibility.

Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: All Interpretation of the Summa Contra
Gentiles, by Thomas S. Hibbs. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1996.
Pp. x, 288. $17.95.
THOMAS D. D'ANDREA, Wolfson College, Cambridge
There is much to be learned from Thomas Hibbs's excellent book on
the Summa Contra Gentiles of Aquinas. Plainly, though relatively early in
his corpus, the SCG is one of Aquinas's most important works and one
whose overarching conception is least understood. This book is a solid
aid to removing much of the incomprehension.
Hibbs's work is heavily preoccupied with questions of genre theory,
and before turning to these it is worth addressing the question of the
genre within which Hibbs himself writes. There is a fundamental problem of choice of style and idiom facing today's Thomist. On the one
hand, the number of Aquinas's philosophical interlocutors was fairly
limited, and he and they were more like minded than not. Metaphysical
realism was far and away the background assumption of the day. Gaps
between Platonists and Aristotelians, significant at the time, were sma 11
compared to the gaps between philosophical conceptual schemes today.
Moreover, Aquinas did not read his Greek philosophical predecessors
in their own language, nor interpret their thought in its cultural context
in any detailed way, as we can today. He was first and foremost a theologian addressing fellow Roman Catholics and, in so doing, making
use of what were by his own judgment the best philosophical resources
available at the time and in the manner in which they were then available. During the course of his lifetime he produced something which
amounts to a philosophical system, a set of systematically interconnected philosophical theses, largely but not exclusively of Aristotelian
provenance, covering the areas of ontology, natural philosophy, philosophical psychology, the theory of knowledge, moral theory, etc. And he
did this to serve the presentation of revealed religious doctrine.
There is a spirit of Thomas Aquinas, a spirit which embraces both
method and substance, and by which genuine devotees are, as it were,
bound. On the former front there is the great commitment to philosophi-

